

ERIC THOMAS WEBER

Clearing the Path to Human Rights

Introduction

Contemporary political philosophers devote a great deal of attention to the subject of human rights. Those who wish for a better world claim that the human rights of so many are violated and must be protected. The trouble with such an approach is that human rights ought not be pointed to as principles to which one can plainly refer, as common standards of decency which guide all people. If they were common standards, we would not find the situations of egregious oppression and suffering that we do. Authors such as John Rawls speak of standards of decency as the philosophical foundations for human rights. But, he grounds human rights "in a liberal conception" of justice in *The Law of Peoples*.¹ Others, such as Richard Rorty, claim their origin is actually to be found in sentimentality. For Rorty, what is needed is sentimental *education* for human rights to be enforced and sustained.

The trouble with these views is that they begin with the belief that we already have *de facto* moral human rights. So long as this approach is taken, progress will be stunted, for neither of these approaches at grounding human rights truly addresses the problem. The historical challenge of instituting human rights rests in converting or persuading others to the cause. So long as Rawls's approach is one grounded on a *liberal* conception of justice, he merely preaches to the choir of political liberals. A similar trouble in Rorty's account of human rights is that it gives no explanation for how it is we will arrive at an authoritative conception of the correct sentiments. Who is to decide what are the correct sentiments? *How* will these be decided? How will they be transferred to others? Is this process even possible? Rorty too, then, seems to preach to the choir of defenders of human rights.

Fortunately, there is hope for human rights. But, before we can progress towards their establishment as *de jure* rights, we must bracket the question: "how can we ground *de facto* human rights in morality?" This question is ir-

relevant to whether or not such rights will be *observed*, and problematically assumes that they are pre-existing, and only lack enforcement. Such appeals to human rights are merely the recent version of natural rights talk, of the sort that Jeremy Bentham so strongly rejected.² What we have in political life are not facts that are independent of us. We have constructions that we establish. As such, we must ask instead, "What are the conditions that will allow the observation of human rights?" This question is a practical one that gets at the heart of the matter, and that depends neither upon liberal conceptions of justice nor upon liberal sentiments. The goal of this paper is to uncover the problems currently stunting the progress of developing *universalizable* human rights, as well as to recommend that we work on establishing at least the basic conditions that are required for such rights. Human nature is more malleable than has previously been conceded in the human rights debate, a point which Rorty deems fruitless, but which other philosophers find meaningful, as does John Lachs of the American philosophical tradition.³

After detailing the trouble with Rawls's and Rorty's approaches to grounding human rights, I will offer an alternative. Conceiving of human rights as a goal yet to be achieved, we can ground them in the autonomous adoption of them by peoples and nations one at a time. Human rights can be established by those nations desiring them *for their own sake*, and without any further need for justification. This way of developing human rights has the potential for universality, and lacks the justificatory difficulties that currently bring endless criticism to that important international forum for peace, the United Nations. This approach avoids the mistakes that plague the various attempts to ground human rights in a singular human nature or a specifically liberal conception of justice. These latter attempts are both misguided and unnecessary impediments to the progress of establishing human rights. I hope to show that the imperialistic attempt to "bring" human rights to nations that have not yet established even the basic conditions for such rights is itself well-intended tyranny, and conflicting with its own goal.

Reversing the Priority of Morality and Justice

There is an important overarching philosophical reorganization necessary for the present analysis of both problematic groundings of human rights, and the development of a new alternative, founded in the concept of the public domain. It is commonly assumed that justice is a subset of morality. For how can we know the good society, without first knowing the good? This line of thinking dates back to ancient Greece. But, why must justice be moral? This question, and in fact any ethical question, is up for debate. This issue is open for debate, however, *only* because of a political environment of justice that allows such inquiry. One cannot debate this point in oppressive states. There-

fore, the political environment which allows or denies debate is prior to the ethical concern in question.

Among many others, utilitarianism and Kantian moral philosophy are widely popular moral systems. Each of these views is considered worthy of respect in moral deliberation. It is precisely this deliberation, however, that allows a society to decide its course of action, adjudicating any competing moral concerns. Moral deliberation is therefore irrelevant without first the establishment of an environment of interaction that allows and follows reason giving rule – the *public domain* of justice. Insights concerning the public domain, as they will be discussed here, are owed to Algis Mickunas's article, "The Public Domain."⁴ If citizens are not respected as sources of reasons and law, their various moralities are subjugated by the dominance of the powerful. Simply put, we must view each person as a source of law, since there is no law that must necessarily be adopted, save that which the individual has embraced. Proof of this argument can be found in those who die for their beliefs. In them, we see that the source of all truly binding law is always the individual. Therefore, in order to harmonize the moral views of competing individuals, justice is required first. Accordingly, justice must not be considered a subset of morality. Rather, the two are conceptually independent, and the judicial process must take precedence over moral deliberation. The conception of morality as prior to justice represents an important impediment to the establishment of human rights.

This ideological reversal is central to my argument here. It must be clear, then, how this different way of thinking about morality and justice plays out for the notion of rights. The reason which underpins this reversal concerns the value of abstract goals. There is a sense in which it is always good to overreach toward one's goals. If we want, therefore, to help people around the world out of oppression and poverty, why not assert that they have the *right* to "life, liberty and security of person," as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? The point I hope to make clear here is that the mere declaration of rights does not establish a lived, useful or meaningful right for those for whom these rights are not upheld. As Bentham points out with respect to natural rights, "hunger is not bread."⁵ Furthermore, there are dangers to undercutting the reputation of the United Nations as an organization which is alleged to be the enforcer of such rights. The approach I offer to the issue of human rights is to give substance to a *de jure* form of human rights, rather than a *de facto* form that is only meaningful in terms of moral aspirations. A great deal of the trouble we find in discussing human rights comes from the misleading sense of the term *rights*, which can be used in either an abstract, goal-stating fashion, or in a real, concrete, lived and enforced sense which cannot be denied. The present paper is not aimed at convincing people of the moral merits of human rights. Rather, it offers an approach to human rights as a real, enforceable goal that can be achieved in steps.

Human Rights and Intervention

John Rawls believes human rights are grounded in justice, and does not separate justice from morality. Thus for Rawls, human rights are also moral rights. What significant philosophical doctrine, then, undergirds Rawls's account of human rights? He admits,

I have not said much about what might be called the philosophical basis of human rights. That is because, *despite* their name, human rights are a special class of rights explained by their role in a liberal conception of the law of peoples acceptable to both well-ordered liberal and hierarchical societies.⁶

Rawls claims to give content to these terms, rather than arguing for his liberal conception. He continues, "war is no longer an admissible means of government policy and is justified only in self-defense, or in grave cases of intervention to protect human rights."⁷ In this sense, if he is claiming there to be *de facto* moral human rights, human rights we all have and deserve on moral grounds, their implications are substantial. They would call for intervention, a measure, given Rawls's claim here, that justifies *war*. Furthermore, were policies made on Rawls's grounds, a great deal of intervention would be called for, and with great frequency. Rawls acknowledges, to his credit, that intervention is only acceptable in *grave* cases of suffering. However, he proclaims these wars to be morally justified based on the faulty assumption that human rights already exist.

In contrast to Rawls's conception of human rights, I would argue that the rationale for intervention falls outside the scope of human rights. While our sense of decency may move us to combat mass murder and other grave cases of suffering, these acts of intervention and war are not fought for pre-existing human rights, but for the aid of those who ask our help. At war, we do not engage in a process of reason-giving rule. War is precisely the great contrast to such a process. Rights are only possible, furthermore, in a system with legitimate authority – not one imposed by powerful liberal nations. Otherwise, we revert simply to a system where "might is right." That system is not morally legitimate in the way Rawls intends it to be.

According to Rawls, the liberal standard of decency, which he defines as the provision of the basic human rights of citizens, ought to be adopted by the entire world. As mentioned above, he claims violations of this standard are sufficient justification for "intervention." Here, intervention refers to the measure of force, be it diplomatic, economic or militaristic, needed to redress Rawls's "indecent societies." One might pointedly question Rawls's characterization of the standard of decency itself, however, and declare it open for

debate. In fact, this integral concept to Rawls's system – decency – he admits is neither derived, demonstrated, nor substantiated in any clear or necessary fashion. He writes,

At no point are we deducing the principles of right and justice, or decency, or the principles of rationality, from a conception of practical reason in the background. Rather, we are giving content to an idea of practical reason and three of its component parts, the ideas of reasonableness, decency, and rationality ... There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these ideas, and differences of opinion are to be expected. We conjecture, however, that, if the content of reasonableness, decency, and rationality is laid out properly, the resulting principles and standards of right and justice will hang together and will be affirmed by us on due reflection. Yet there can be no guarantee.⁸

It is important to question the content given to the notion of decency that Rawls declares. He himself admits that there is no guarantee of consensus for reasonableness and decency, and yet these are alleged to embody a standard of legitimate military intervention. Furthermore, empirical observation demonstrates great opposition to these liberal conceptions. Why then put forth a theory of international justice that is unfounded? Why not dispute it and deny Rawls's liberal content of decency?

When factions forcibly deny human rights and are unwilling to participate in international public debate, indeed nothing but force will change their ways. However, it is conceptually clear that no one can be forced to be autonomous. Nor can anyone be coerced into democracy. So, the nations Rawls deems "indecent" play no part in accepting the interference of his liberal societies. How can Rawls move to the view that intervention is *legitimate*? Because of "principles that hang together ... on due reflection?"⁹ We must be realistic.

It is precisely the engagement of nations in public argument and reasoning that legitimates the democratic ideal of free and autonomous deliberation and that gives priority to reason over tyranny. Clearly, then, wars and intervention are not undergone in defense of legitimate rights. They are either impositions of values, or aid to suffering allies in war. *These are not conditions in which rights are relevant.*

Dehumanization and Sentimentality

In his article, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," Richard Rorty proposes an explanation for the source of violations of human rights. He claims that these violations stem from the act of dehumanization. Rorty poignantly questions those who would not feel the moral connection between themselves

and other homo sapiens. He argues, "people are simply unable to understand why membership in a biological species is supposed to suffice for membership in a moral community."¹⁰ This point, however, precisely leaves the burden of proof on Rorty. As a source of our motivations, sentimentality is an important part. Rorty's proposal of *sentimental* education, however, maintains the same problems he finds in a *rational* grounding of human rights.¹¹ The correct sentimental education itself is not universally understood, nor agreed upon.

Rorty comments on the *New Yorker's* "Letters from Bosnia" of November 1992, which tell of contemporary "dehumanization." He claims,

The moral to be drawn ... is that Serbian murderers and rapists do not think of themselves as violating human rights. For they are not doing these things to fellow human beings, but to *Muslims*. They are not being inhuman, but rather are discriminating between the true humans and the pseudohumans. They are making the same sort of distinction as the Crusaders made between humans and infidel dogs, and the Black Muslims make between humans and blue-eyed devils.¹²

Here, we see the extent to which our value judgments are inherent in our classification of humanity. From Rorty's example, it is clear how ulterior purposes and prejudices may be concealed in a seemingly disinterested categorization of humanity.

The values of our enemies often seem so different from ours that we believe them to be inhuman. As such, they do not seem to require moral respect. On Rorty's view, sentimentality is the basis of our obligations towards these humans that we ought to respect, and yet our sentimentalities are various and are in need of education, he claims. Indeed, what we need is the *proper* sentimental education. Of course, the difficulty arises in determining and demonstrating what that proper education should be.

Rorty recognizes that our failure at establishing the philosophical grounds for human rights stems from attempting to determine *the* singular characteristic of human nature. According to Rorty, "in the two centuries since the French Revolution, we have learned that human beings are far more malleable than Plato or Kant had dreamed."¹³ When we go hungry, when we are subjected to any number of cruelties, reason and all of the other allegedly distinctly human characteristics become secondary to our struggles for survival. Remarkably, Rorty does not recognize that sentimentality as a criterion of human classification is equally malleable and problematic. Sentimentality is a characteristic we embody *after* having secured our daily bread.¹⁴ Because so many attempts at discovering the true characterization of humanity have failed, Rorty advises us to abandon the effort to uncover anything further on human nature.

One might conclude instead, however, that something has indeed been said about human nature, implied by the concept of malleability. On grounds similar to Rorty's, John Lachs concludes that human nature must be multiplicitous. There is no singular human nature, but many.¹⁵ Suddenly we become attentive to human variety, and are *more* able to treat individuals with respect, since in this way we may acknowledge and accept the numerous instantiations of humanity. This way we do not judge one nature as inherently wrong merely because it differs from our own. Learning from Rorty's conclusion that there is in fact nothing substantive to be proclaimed concerning singular conceptions of human nature, we may recognize the importance of addressing the *malleability* of human natures and their role in the process of legitimating international policy.

A New Approach to Human Rights

If there is one point to be taken from my efforts here, it is that we would benefit from thinking of human rights as a goal, rather than as an unenforced reality. The great danger of missing this point is the hindrance of future progress. If we profess to have human rights that are simply unenforced, the world's opinion of the United Nations and its efforts will continue to diminish. The first section to follow will discuss some of these criticisms and problems the U.N. faces.

Next, the public domain, the most essential requirement for the establishment of human rights will be explored. This requirement consists of the *fundamental* conditions and assumptions upon which all other human rights must be established. It is beyond both the aim and the scope of this paper to offer a list of human rights. As a matter of fact, it would be better for them not to be considered a static set. The needs and dynamics of human flourishing are not unchanging biological characteristics. They are often social. Wherever our efforts lead in terms of the future of human rights, the most basic necessary conditions for realizing any at all must be our priority. Until we recognize this first step towards human rights, progress cannot be achieved.

The Importance of a New Way of Thinking

There are two important reasons to conceive of human rights in a new way. The first pertains to the obvious long-term goal of establishing and maintaining real rights upon which people can truly count – advancing them beyond the state of unobserved declarations. The second concerns the impact that the alleged “failure” at enforcing human rights has had upon the United Nations. One particular criticism of the U.N.'s ineffectiveness will serve as proof of the damage to which I have alluded. Next, a few words seem warranted

to defend the fundamental role played by the U.N., since even in the United States, arguments for its irrelevance can be found. *The New York Times*, as recently as November 14th, 2004, reported conflicts between the White House and the U.N.. It writes that “warnings were resurfacing at the White House that the United Nations was risking becoming irrelevant and that such comments were now being combined with a dismissive attitude toward Mr. Annan himself.”¹⁶

Among the criticisms that have led to such low opinions of the United Nations is the following. Loubna Freih, in the *International Herald Tribune*, recently reported that:

The high-level report on U.N. reform released last month is being touted as the most far-reaching overhaul proposal for the international organization since its creation. Yet for those of us working in human rights, it offers little cure to the ills that have befallen a critically important U.N. institution: the Commission on Human Rights. The section of the report on reforming the Human Rights Commission highlights a serious credibility problem that often casts doubt on the overall reputation of the United Nations.¹⁷

It suffices to note the damage that the U.N. endures due to its overreaching approach to human rights. Were human rights not considered to be in effect without enforcement, the reputation of the U.N. would not be called into question on this issue.

The reasons for defending the U.N. are simple. First, it is clearly an establishment for peace, facilitating dialogue between nations, and offering a disinterested format and process for the resolution of conflict. Second, it aids in the implementations of agreements that are fundamental for trade and related procedures. Third, it offers a forum for collective efforts, regarding all global concerns, be they environmental, scientific, or humanitarian. The burden placed on the United Nations with regard to human rights, however, is one that would be better addressed by individual nations working to establish and maintain their own public domain of justice. The role of the United Nations in this regard would be to facilitate these projects, as in the many ways in which it is currently helping developing and war-torn nations.

The Public Domain and Its Requirements

When attempting to establish human rights, we must remember that we are creating an equality that is not given to humanity, but *by* humanity – thus, these are *de jure* rights. Human rights cannot be based on the sheer equivalence of human beings, for such a view is disrespectful of the essential differ-

ences between individuals. A pure egalitarian view of humanity, as well as disrespectful, is ignorant of empirical data involving persons. It is plainly wrong to claim that one person is equal to another, empirically speaking. Rather, we are equal *only* insofar as we establish an equality of respect for all as sources of law in a public domain, in which opposing views may be adjudicated. The public domain, therefore, is the first and most fundamental requirement of human rights. It is a social space with room for the evaluation of the claims of all. It involves an acceptance of the legitimacy of each person's voice. In this sense, the public domain derives its power from the people. Within it, various political doctrines can be debated, each for its own merits. In it, the power of one person over another is irrelevant to free debate, for the end of this equality is to determine the most appropriate course of action. Its power is derived from each person's acceptance of the respect for public reason-giving. In this manner, the public domain assumes an *equal* respect for all persons. What follows is an examination of this domain, and the conditions for its establishment.

The first and foremost condition for human rights in any nation must be the freedom to express and discuss one's thoughts and opinions without the threat of death. To conceive of this situation as a right essentially is backwards, for there are no *de jure* rights before having the ability to discuss their establishment. Oppressive dictatorships and dogmatic religious nations often prevent this condition in the interest of preserving the power relationship, or influence over believers. This first condition, if not accompanied by the power to make decisions and act on the basis of argument and public deliberation is vacuous. Thus, this first condition implies democracy (as a source of power and legitimacy, *not* as a form of government).¹⁸

What good would deliberation be without the means to critique it? An essential element in the maintenance of the public domain, therefore, is education. The public domain holds no weight if the autonomous citizens adjudicating between social viewpoints can be swayed by empty rhetoric, and are incapable of mounting defensive arguments due to their lack of education. In this sense, after equality of respect in the public domain, access to education is the second most important factor in the maintenance of equal rights. Mickunas, arguing for precisely this point calls the necessary education "political technocracy."¹⁹ We must learn the techniques and methods for acting upon public deliberations.

In order to learn about a nation's concerns, interests or troubles, the press is necessary. A government that controls the press in an effort to manipulate the public, however, is not one that leaves the power to the people in acting for the public interest. We could not rightly describe this nation as having a *public* domain. Thus, a *free* press is necessary to learn about the issues that require debate and the address of citizens. Of the free press, Mickunas writes, "what is called the free press should be the facilitator of dialogue

and, as an institution, play a leading role in keeping this discourse open and public."²⁰

Each of these conditions works hand in hand toward the end of creating a state's or people's public domain that can establish and maintain basic rights for all. These conditions are not only necessary for civil rights, but for *any* rights, including any meaningful set of established *human* rights. While this set of conditions is basic, its role in the development of basic rights to be established around the world must not be underestimated. If we are serious about ensuring a basic set of rights for all people, we must fulfill the conceptual requirements, and mirror past successes for the establishment of *de jure* rights.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I hope to have achieved four goals. The first is to have revealed the great frailty of two fundamental approaches to justifying the philosophical basis for *moral* human rights. The second is to have shown the value of conceiving of human rights as *de jure* rights, as a goal *to be* achieved, and not yet universal. The third is to have offered an alternate aim and approach for the establishment of human rights by those nations who have not yet instituted the essential conditions for such rights. Finally, the fourth is to have offered specific conditions that are achievable, and that can be encouraged in nations that do not share our liberal values, such that they may one day also autonomously, and thus legitimately, adopt democratic values and basic rights for their citizens.

A further important task to be undertaken in approaching the goal of human rights will be to elucidate the specific measures needed to establish a public domain in nations where there has not been one before while retaining respect for the autonomy of individuals. This process can only begin once we realize that human rights are not assured by historical international declarations. They are substantiated only by the interaction of autonomous individuals who freely choose to treat others as equal sources of law, and as the sources of claims to be debated in the public domain. The mere imposition of foreign values on others is dangerous. The notion that all people are ready and willing to adopt democracy is idealistic and misguided. The shift I recommend, from punitive measures motivated by alleged violations of human rights to efforts at assisting nations desiring aid, is perhaps the most fundamental of the changes proposed by the present critique of human rights.

The dangers of condoning a misguided sense of universal human rights, grounded on some solely liberal conception of justice, sentimentality, or morality, include a dramatic disrespect for the variability of individuals, an international system of justification for war, and the diminishment of the reputation

of the United Nations. The establishment of basic rights can be encouraged in other nations in many different ways. That undertaking, however, must not contradict the aim of establishing a democratic public domain that is the foundation for the rights we aspire to establish for all. When we violently impose on others our values of democracy and liberal rights, in effect we are secularizing a coercive crusade that conflicts with the freedom requisite for human rights.

References

1. Rawls, John, *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 78. L.P. hereafter.
2. Bentham, Jeremy, "Nonsense Upon Stilts", as found in Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin & Cyprian Blamires, *Rights, Representation and Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution*, Oxford, 2002.
3. See Lachs, John, "Human Natures", in *The Relevance of Philosophy to Life*, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995, 228-242.
4. Mickunas, Algis, "The Public Domain", in *Open Institutions: The Hope for Democracy*, John W. Murphy and Dennis L. Peck, editors, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993, 177-191. "P.D." hereafter.
5. Bentham, 330.
6. Rawls, L.P., 78. Emphasis added.
7. *Ibid.*, 79.
8. Rawls, L.P., 86-87. Emphasis added.
9. Rawls, L.P., 87.
10. Rorty, Richard, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality", in *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures*, 1993, 125. H.R. hereafter.
11. Rorty offers his proposal in response to what he effectively critiques as illegitimate moral grounds for human rights - in terms of singular conceptions of human nature. It is difficult to see, given his own claim in this regard, how he can expect greater results from human sentimentality, which is no more unifying or demonstrated than its alternative human characteristics.
12. Rorty, H.R., p. 112.
13. *Ibid.*, 121.
14. It is true that there are those who would rather starve than submit to oppression, however, this view further supports the claim of malleability of the individual and lacks any specific tie to sentimentality. One might also claim that humans would submit to the sentimentality of feeding children before themselves, but this certainly is not a universal reaction. A prime counterexample is found in Nicholas Kristof's "Helping Binyam, When His Mother Won't", in *The New York Times*, May 20th, 2003.
15. Lachs, John, 228-242.
16. See "U.S. and U.N. Are Once Again the Odd Couple Over Iraq", in *The New York Times*, November 14, 2004, Section 1, 15, and in "Inside," in passage headlined: "U.S. and U.N. Snipe Again."

17. Freih, Loubna, "Overhaul of the U.N.'s Human Rights Body; Evicting the Abusers", in *The International Herald Tribune*, January 18, 2005, Opinion, 6.
18. For details on this distinction, between democracy as a source of power and as a form of government, refer to Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, "Section II: Containing The Definitive Articles For Perpetual Peace Among States", 13.
19. Mickunas, "P.D.," 186.
20. *Ibid.*, 189.

Bibliography

- BENTHAM, Jeremy, "Nonsense Upon Stilts", in Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin & Cyprian Blamires, *Rights, Representation and Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution*, Oxford, 2002.
- FREIH, Loubna, "Overhaul of the U.N.'s human rights body; Evicting the Abusers", in *The International Herald Tribune*, January 18, 2005, Opinion, 6.
- KANT, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1957.
- KRISTOF, Nicholas, "Helping Binyam, When His Mother Won't", in *The New York Times*, May 20th, 2003.
- LACHS, John, *The Relevance of Philosophy to Life*, Nashville, TN.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995.
- MICKUNAS, Algis, "The Public Domain: Rights and Responsibilities", in *Open Institutions*, ed. J. Murphy and D. Peck, London: Praeger, 1993, 177-191.
- RAWLS, John, *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- , *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- RORTY, Richard, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality", in *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures*, 1993, Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, editors. New York: Basic Books, 1993, 111-134.
- "U.S. and U.N. Are Once Again the Odd Couple Over Iraq", in *The New York Times*, November 4, 2004, Section 1, 15.

ERIC THOMAS WEBER is a PhD candidate at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA, where he is studying the social and political philosophy of John Dewey.

*H*umanity at the Turning Point

Rethinking Nature, Culture and Freedom

Essays on Contemporary Philosophy
Edited by Sonja Servomaa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface, Sonja Servomaa	9
Kristana Arp Seeking a New Sort of Freedom	10
Oliva Blanchette Globalization and Dehumanization; A Political and Cultural Critique of the Global Corporate Economy	16
Karin Brown Ethics and Mechanics: Towards a New Paradigm	29
Jean A. Campbell Civilization and its Conceits – An Exploration of Principles to Guide Energy Use	43
Frank W. Derrigh Without Roots: of Trees, Travel, and Transcendence	56
Julio Cesar Diaz Eudaimonia, Tyche, Alterity. The Place of the Alterity in Greek Thought	70
David Drebusenko Prefrontal Deficit and (In)Compatibilism: Can Neuroscience Solve the Free Will Problem?	81
Richard Findler Usufruct and The Commons: An Old Idea for a New Environmental Ethic	91
Hope K. Fitz and Christopher Vasilopoulos Conditions for Individual Freedom as Applied to the European Union	103
Astrid Friedrich Images: Rethinking Nature and the Subject	117
Justin Good Ecology, Freedom and Automobility	131
Graham Harman Bruno Latour and the Politics of Nature	147
Grant Havers The Meaning of 'Neo-Paganism': Rethinking the Relation between Nature and Freedom"	159
Jessica Hayes-Conroy and Francis Conroy Popular Education for a Free Society: Joining Logos and Ergon at the Institute for Social Ecology	170

Renvall Institute Publications 23

The Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies
University of Helsinki
Helsinki 2006

ISSN 0786-6445

ISBN 952-10-3060-7

Cover photograph: Sonja Servomaa
Graphic design: Antti Pokela
Print: Dark Oy, Helsinki 2006